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Attorney fees have existed for almost as long as attorneys have
existed.' Attorney fees represent an important gear that keeps the
wheels of our judicial system turning. Yet, despite a long history,
some of the procedures which govern attorney fees are ill-defined.
In the United States, under the so-called "American Rule," there
is generally no recovery of attorney fees by one party from the
other party.2 However, exceptions to the general rule allow the
prevailing party to recover attorney fees from the losing party in
certain instances.3 Whenever the losing party is ordered to pay
attorney fees to the prevailing party, the attorney will want security
that the other side will pay those fees.4 This is especially true

1. RoscoE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMEs, 34 (1953) The
beginning of lawyers traces back to Ancient Greece, although the term "lawyer" was not used then.
Id. In Ancient Rome and in the Early Middle Ages, "advocates" received only a gift-fee and had
no legal right to fees. Id. at 68. In the late Middle Ages, the law was set forth that attorneys could
sue for their fees, but barristers still only received a gift-fee and had no legal right to fees. Id at 104.
2. See infra notes 16-20 and accompanying text (discussing the American Rule).
3. See infra notes 21-62 and accompanying text (discussing the exceptions to the American

Rule).
4. See infra notes 297-298 and accompanying text (explaining why an attorney would want
security that fees will be paid).
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where the party ordered to pay the attorney fees appeals the
judgment, because the attorney will have to await the resolution of
the appeal before collecting the fees.- If the court orders the
appealing party to post a bond for the fees pending appeal, the
respondent's attorney will have security for the attorney fees.
Whether the court will require a bond may depend on whether the
court classifies attorney fees as costs of the suit or as damages. 6
In certain instances, it may depend on whether equity requires a
bond to be posted.
Generally, a judgment for costs is automatically stayed pending
appeal. 7 Three relatively new California cases address attorney fees
categorization for the purpose of posting appeal bonds.8 These
cases are seemingly inconsistent as to whether a judgment for
attorney fees requires a bond to be posted in order to stay
execution pending appeal.9 One case held that attorney fees
awarded pursuant to contract are costs, and are automatically stayed
pending appeal."x Another case held that attorney fees awarded as
sanctions are monetary damages, and require the appellant to post
a bond to stay them pending appeal." Finally, a third case held
that expert witness fees, which the court analogized to attorney

5.

See infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text (discussing procedures for posting appeal

bonds).
6. See infra notes 106-113 and accompanying text (discussing differences between costs and
damages in procedures for posting appeal bonds).
7.
See infra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing appeal bonds).
8. See Banks v. Manos, 232 Cal. App. 3d 123, 129, 283 Cal. Rptr. 318, 321 (1992)
(addressing attorney fees and posting appeal bonids); Bank of San Pedro v. Municipal Court of Los
Angeles, 3 Cal. App. 4th 950, 956-57, 377, 283 Cal. Rptr. 372, 376 (1991) (Bank of San Pedro was
originally cited as 232 Cal. App. 3d 370, but was reprinted for tracking purposes after the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari) (addressing expert witness fees and posting appeal bonds);
Neilsen v. Stumbos, 226 Cal. App. 3d 301,305, 276 Cal. Rptr. 272, 275 (1990) (addressing attorney
fees and posting appeal bonds); see also infra notes 177-207 and accompanying text (discussing
Neilsen);notes 208-241 and accompanying text (discussing Banks);notes 243-263 and accompanying
text (discussing Bank of San Pedro).
9.
See infra notes 177-207 and accompanying text (discussing Neilsen); notes 208-241 and
accompanying text (discussing Banks); notes 243-263 and accompanying text (discussing Bank ofSan
Pedro).
10. Neilsen, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 305, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 275. See infra notes 177-184 and
accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding of Neilsen).
11. Banks, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 129, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 321. See infra notes 208-241 and
accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding of Banks).
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fees, are monetary damages, and require the appellant to post a
12
bond to stay them pending appeal.
The purpose of this Comment is to identify the confusion
created by the aforementioned cases, and to demonstrate that the
California courts or legislature must resolve the problem by
definitively declaring whether attorney fees are automatically
stayed pending appeal. Part I of this Comment explores the legal
background of attorney fees in California. 3 Part II discusses three
recent California appellate court cases which considered whether a
judgment for attorney fees is automatically stayed pending
appeal. 14 Finally, Part m discusses. the ramifications of those
appellate cases and suggests alternatives to settle the apparent legal
inconsistencies.' 5
I. BACKGROUND AND CURRENT STATE OF THE
LAW REGARDING ATrORNEY FEES
After briefly reviewing the American Rule and its exceptions,
this section discusses the differences between statutory, contractual
and equitable attorney fees for the purposes of filing an application
for attorney fees. This section also explains California's procedural
process for posting appeal bonds for both costs and money
judgments.

12. Bank of San Pedro,3 Cal. App. 4th at 957,283 Cal. Rptr. at 376. See infra notes 243-263
and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding of Bank of San Pedro).
13. See infra notes 16-169 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 170-266 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 267-301 and accompanying text.

144

1992 / Inconsistent ProceduresRegarding Attorney Fees
A. Availability of Attorney Fees
1. The American Rule
In the United States, attorney fees are generally not recoverable
as an item of costs of a suit.16 In all other major common law
systems, courts routinely award attorney fees to the party that
prevails in the action.17 Under the American Rule, parties pay

16. For cases holding that attorney fees are not recoverable as costs, see e.g., Boeing Co. v.
Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472,478,481 (1981), aft'g, 590 F.2d433, 437 (2d Cir. 1978); Alaska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,247 (1975); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375, 391-92 (1970); Schwartz v. Folloder, 767 F.2d 125, 132 (5th Cir. 1985); Woods v. Barnett
Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1014 (11th Cir. 1985); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 80 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied sub nom, Lewy v. Weinberger, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); Silberman v. Bogle, 683
F.2d 62, 64 (3d Cir. 1982); Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 180 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Petrites v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 646 F.2d 1033, (5th Cir. 1981); Huddleston v. Herman &
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 559 (5th Cir. 1981), modified, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Reiser v. Del Monte
Prop. Co., 605 F.2d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 1979); Melton v. Unterreiner, 575 F.2d 204,209 (8th Cir.
1978); Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1087 (2d Cir. 1977);
Shaw v. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp., 534 F.2d 786, 788 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,434 U.S.
852 (1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 599 (3d Cir. 1976); Bailey v. Meister Brau,
Inc., 535 F.2d 982, 994 (7th Cir. 1976); Jackson v. Oppenbeim, 533 F.2d 826, 831 (2d Cir. 1977);
Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 555,559 (7th Cir. 1975); Ramey v. Cincinnati
Enquirer, Inc., 508 F.2d 1188, 1195 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1048 (1975); Grace v.
Ludwig, 484 F.2d 1262, 1267 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1975); Mitchell v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 106 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), and cert
deniedsub nom. Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 405 U.S. 918 (1972); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424
F.2d 161, 165 (3d Cir. 1969) cert denied sub nom., Glen Alden Corp. v. Kahan, 398 U.S. 950
(1970); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 503 F. Supp. 802, 811 (N.D. 111.1980); Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F.
Supp. 714, 744 (M.D.N.C. 1980); Stull v. Baker, 410 F. Supp. 1326, 1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Academic Computer Sys., Inc. v. Yarmouth, 71 F.R.D. 198, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Kerby v.
Commodity Resources Inc., 395 F. Supp. 786, 790 (D. Colo. 1975); Epic Enters., Inc. v. Brothers,
395 F. Supp. 777, 778 (N.D. Okla. 1975); Crasto v. Kaskel, 63 F.R.D. 25, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Chaney v. Western States Title Ins. Co., 292 F. Supp. 376,379-80 (D. Utah 1968); Stevens v. Abbott
Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836 848 (E.D. Va. 1968); see also Miller-Lindsey Lehrman, The Tune
to Filefor Fees, 11 Lrno. 33, 33 (Winter, 1985) (stating that the American Rule has been the law
in the federal courts ever since Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1790)).
17. See Neil Williams, Fee Shifting and Public Interest Litigation, 64 A.B.A. 3. 859, 859
(June, 1978) (noting that the American treatment of attorney fees and costs of litigation is unique in
the common law world and may be considered, by other countries, to be the most distinctive feature
of American Civil Procedure); Joyce Dougherty, After Alyeska: Will Public Interest Litigation
Survive, 16 SANTA CLARA L RLrv. 267, 268 (1976) (stating that the American practice differs from
that of almost every other country in the world).
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their own attorney fees, no matter which party prevails." In
California, as well as in other states and in the federal courts,
legislatures and courts have carved out exceptions to the American
Rule.19 Parties to a transaction may also avoid the American Rule
by contracting for the prevailing party to pay the other party's
attorney fees in the event of litigation.2"

18. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, 25 Cal. 3d 124, 127, 599 P.2d 83, 84, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 2 (1979) (indicating that the American Rule is that a prevailing party's attorney fees are not
recoverable unless a contract between the parties or a statute so provides); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1021 (West Supp. 1992) (codifying the American Rule that the measure and mode of compensation
of attorneys is left to agreements between the parties, unless attorney fees are specifically provided
for by statute); see also Williams, supra note 17, at 859 (noting that the purpose of the English Rule
is to indemnify prevailing parties for the expense the parties had to bear for vindicating their legal
rights). The English Rule also serves to discourage litigation, because it provides a strong incentive
to settle. Young v. Redman, 55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 835-36, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86, 91 (1976) (quoting
Fleischmam Corp. v. Maier Brewing, 386 U.S. 714,718 (1967)) (stating that the American Rule was
based upon the philosophy that a person should not be penalized for defending or prosecuting a suit,
and, if the penalty for losing includes attorney fees of the other party, the poor may be unjustly
discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights). See Arthur Goodhart, Costs, 38 YAI.E
LI. 849, 873-77 (1929) (suggesting that the reason for the American Rule was that the American
public basically distrusted lawyers and that lawyers were unnecessary, since the law could be
understood by anyone). Additionally, the English Rule might tend to discourage poor litigants from
bringing suit, because they would not want to risk having to pay two sets of attorney fees. Id This
would defeat the principle that the courts are open to everyone. Id But see Sciarotta v. Teaford
Constr. Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 444, 451, 167 Cal. Rptr. 889, 893 (1980) (indicating that a broad
policy of granting attorney fees raises a possibility that litigation might ensue for its own sake, and
the restrictive policy avoids encouragement or needless litigation and encourages settlement);
Dougherty, supra note 17, at 269 (pointing out that the English Rule may actually encourage suits,
because plaintiffs may be inspired by the prospect of recovering both damages and fees).
19. See Taylor, ResistanceStiffens to Abandonment ofthe American Rule, 5 ORANGE COUNTY
BJ. 343, 350 (1979) (listing 52 statutory exceptions in California in which attorney fees are awarded
to the prevailing party); Michael Green, From Here to Attorney Fees: Certainty, Efficiency, and
Fairnessin the Journey to the Appellate Courts, 69 CORNE.L REV. 207, 217-18 (1984) (estimating
that there are over one hundred federal statutes that provide for attorney fees, typically to the
prevailing party); see also Alyeska Pipeline Ser. Co. v. Wilderness Socy., 421 U.S. 240, 260-261
n.33 (1975) (giving a list of federal statutes which provide for attorney fees). Some statutes make the
award mandatory, such as the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 216(b) (1938), and the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1968). Id Other statutes
make the award discretionary with the court, such as the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1952), and the
Civil Rights Act of 1946, tiL %, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1964). Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260-61 n.33.
20. See infra notes 24-34 and accompany text (discussing contractual provisions for attorney
fees).
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2. Three Exceptions to the American Rule
InCalifornia, the basic provision for recovery of attorney fees
is California Code of Civil Procedure [hereinafter CCP] section
1021.21 Section 1021 provides that, unless attorney fees are
specifically allowed by statute, they are left to the agreement of the
parties. 2 Perhaps the largest exception to the American Rule in
California is the last part of section 1021, that the American Rule
can be changed by "agreement, express or implied, of the
parties." 3
a. ContractualAttorney Fees
The California courts consistently acknowledge that CCP
section 1021 permits attorney fees awards against opposing parties
pursuant to contractual agreement. 24 Parties to a contract regularly
include attorney fee provisions in the contract. 5 Attorney fee
provisions usually authorize fees to specified parties or to the
"prevailing party ' 21 inthe event of litigation.27 Due to unequal
bargaining power of the parties, fee provisions were frequently

21. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1021 (West Supp. 1992) (providing: '[e]xcept as attorney's
fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and
counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties; but parties to actions or
proceedings are entitled to their costs, as hereinafter provided.").
22. Id
23. Id
24. See, e.g., Iverson v. Spang Indus., Inc., 45 Cal. App. 3d 303, 312,119 Cal. Rptr. 399,405
(1975) (stating that where a contract provides for attorney fees without specifying a fixed sum, the
amount of the award is within the discretion of the court); Nevin v. Salk, 45 Cal. App. 3d 331, 334,
119 Cal. Rptr. 370, 374 (1971) (stating that a provision in an agreement that one party agrees to pay
reasonable attorney fees is valid); Malibou Lake Mountain Club v. Smith, 18 Cal. App. 3d 31, 35,
95 Cal. Rptr. 553, 556 (1971) (affitming the validity of a contractual provision directing the payment
of attorney fees).
25.

Attorney Fees, 1984 CAL. CONTINUING EDUC. BAR § 1.311, 1.

26.

See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1717(b)(1) (West Supp. 1992) (indicating that the prevailing party

is the one who recovered greater relief in the action, but if the case is dismissed there is no prevailing

party). But see CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1032 (West Supp. 1992) (indicating that the term
.'prevailing party" also includes a defendant who obtains a dismissal, a defendant where neither
party obtains relief, or the party who the court determines is the prevailing party).
27. Kent Scheidegger, Attorney's Fees and Civil Code Section 1717, 13 PAc. LJ.233, 233
(1981).
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structured to entitle attorney fees to only one party to the
contract. 2 The California Legislature enacted California Civil
Code section 1717 to remedy this unfairness by creating a
reciprocal right to attorney fees whenever a contract entitles one
party to attorney fees but not the other party.2 9 Under section
1717, when a contract contains a fee provision that benefits only
one party to the transaction, the prevailing party may recover
attorney fees, even if the fee provision was not intended to benefit
that party.30 Section 1717 thus converts a unilateral contractual
right to recover attorney fees into a bilateral right for either party
to recover attorney fees.31 Section 1717 assists persons who are
disadvantaged by unequal bargaining positions and protects their
rights by allowing the recovery of attorney fees. 32 Although courts
usually use section 1717 to award attorney fees to the party who is
not benefitted by the unilateral contract fee provision, in the past

28. See id The drafters of form contracts customarily include clauses providing for attorney
fees, generally benefitting only the drafter of the form. Id A typical one-sided provision for attorney
fees would read: -[l]n the event that Buyer defaults on the payments due under this contract, Buyer

agrees to pay all costs of collection, including reasonable attorney fees." l at 233 n.l.
29. See International Indus., Inc. v. Olen, 21 Cal. 3d 218,222-23,577 P.2d 1031, 1036, 145
-Cal. Rptr. 691, 693 (1978) (indicating the legislative intent behind the enactment of California Civil
Code section 1717 was to provide a reciprocal right to attorney fees).
30. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1717 (West Supp. 1992). This section provides in pertinent part:
(a) [in any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's
fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one
of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party,
prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not,
shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs.
Id; cf. Asuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01 (West 1991) (providing that in any contested action
arising out of a contract, the court may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party, even
if the contract does not provide for attorney fees).
31. T.E.D. Bearing Co. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 38 Cal. App. 3d 59,62, 112 CaL Rptr. 910,
914 (1974); see also Scheidegger, supra note 27, at 235 (referring to Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp. v.
Howard J. White, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d 226, 272, 461 P.2d 33, 36, 81 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1969)
(illustrating that even in cases tried prior to the enactment of section 1717, the courts softened the
impact of one-sided attorney fee clauses because such clauses were believed to be contrary to public
policy as encouraging frivolous litigation and allowing the party benefitted by the provision to impose
any settlement on the other party just by threatening to raise the costs of the suit higher than the
amount actually being disputed); Coast Bank v. Holmes, 19 Cal. App. 3d 581,597 n.3, 97 Cal. Rptr.
30, 39 n.3 (1971) (indicating that another purpose of section 1717 is to provide protection for parties
to a contract who have less bargaining power).
32. T.ED. Bearing Co., 38 Cal. App. 3d at 63, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 913; Coast Bank 19 Cal.
App. 3d at 597 n.3, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 39 n.3.
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courts have also used section 1717 to award attorney fees to the
party who is benefitted by the unilateral fee provision.3 3 In
addition to rights to attorney fees arising out of contracts, statutes
may provide an independent basis for recovery of attorney fees.3'
b. Statutory Attorney Fees
In California, there are many statutory exceptions to the
American Rule.35 California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021
acknowledges that, in addition to contractual rights to attorney fees,

33. Beneficial Standard Props, Inc. v. Sharps, 67 Cal. App. 3d 227,230, 136 Cal. Rptr. 549,
551 (1977); see, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, 25 Cal. App. 3d 124, 128,599 P.2d 83, 87,
158 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1979); Sain v. Silvestre, 78 Cal. App. 3d 461, 475, 144 Cal. Rptr. 478, 487
(1978) (indicating that section 1717 applies whether the contractual provision for attorney fees is
bilateral or unilateral). But see Scheidegger, supra note 27, at 241 (arguing that section 1717 should
apply to unilateral clauses only).
34. See infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text (describing statutes that provide for awards
of attorney fees).
35. See Atorney Fees,supra note 25, at 255-67 (isting 234 provisions for attorney fee awards
in California); see, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 7044, 7168 (West Supp. 1992); CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 798.85, 1717, 1798.46, 1798.53, 19425, 2983.4, 2988.9, 3250, 1714.1(b), 1788.30(c),
1798.48(b), 1799.2,1811.1,789.3(d) (West 1982,1985 and Supp. 1992); CAL Civ. PROC. CODE §§

730, 731.5 (West 1980 and 1987); CAL EDUC. CODE § 43048(b) (West Supp. 1992); CAL GOV'T
CODE § 19765 (West 1980); CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 25455 (West 1986); CAL. PUB. UTIL CODE §
453 (West Supp. 1992) (providing that the court shal award attorney fees to the prevailing party);
CAL Civ. CODE §§ 815.7,1584.6; 1584-5,2528 (West Supp. 1992); CAL CIv. PROC. CODE 99 396b,
527.6(h), 1021.5,1021.6 (West Supp. 1992); CAL FN. CODE §§ 865.6(e), 15153(d), 18333(e) (West
1989); CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 11130.5, 12965(b), 54960.5, 91012 (West 1980 and Supp. 1992)
(providing that the court may award attorney fees to the prevailing party); CAL BUS. & PROF. CODE
§§ 17082, 10238.7, 16750(a), 21140.4 (West 1987 and Supp. 1992); CAL CIV. CODE §§ 1747.50(c),
1747.60(c), 1747.70(d), 1785.31(d), 1786.50(a)(2),1787.3,1812.34,1812.123(a) (West 1985); CAL.
Civ. PRoc. CODE §§ 491.160, 1030, 1031(c), 1036, 1235.140(b), 1245.060(b) (West Supp. 1992);
CAL CoRp. CODE 9 27200 (West 1977); CAL ED. CODE § 67139.5 (West 1989); CAL HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 7109 (West 1970); CAL INs. CODE § 11629, 11708 (West 1988); CAL LAB. CODE
§§ 432.7(b), 1197.5(g), 3709,3709.5,3860,3856,5801 (West 1985 and Supp. 1992); CAL PENAL
CODE §§ 496, 593d (West Supp. 1992); CAL STs. & HIGH. CODE §§ 5412,6615,9354,8831 (West
1969 and Supp. 1992); CAL UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1957 (West 1986); CAL WEIF. & INST. CODE §§
10962, 19709 (West 1984 and 1991) (providing that the court shall award attorney fees to the
successful plaintiff or injured party); CAL. Bus. & PRop. CODE §§ 21202,22386 (West 1987); CAL
Civ. CODE §§ 52(a), 54.3,1794,56.35, 1794.1(a)-(b), 1794.1(b), 1812.62(a), 1812.94(a) (West 1985,
1982 and Supp. 1992); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 482.110(b), 491.130,585(a) (West Supp. 1992);
CAL EvID. CODE § 1158 (West Supp. 1992); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 800, 31536, 13965(c), 13973(e)
(West 1980 and Supp. 1992); CAL HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 268505(b) (West Supp. 1992); CAL.
INS. CODE § 1619 (West Supp. 1992); CAL LAB. CODE §§ 4555,4607,4903.2,5410.1,5710 (West
1989); CAL PENAL CODE § 653.60 (West 1988) (providing that the court may award attorney fees
to the plaintiff or injured party).
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statutes may authorize attorney fees. 6 Statutes typically, although
not exclusively, provide that the prevailing party may recover
attorney fees.37 Statutory attorney fees provisions have two fixed
characteristics. Each statute indicates both the threshold of success
that a party must attain to recover attorney fees, and the amount of
discretion the court has in awarding fees to a party meeting the
threshold requirement.3" The degree of success required to recover
attorney fees extends over a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum
are statutes permitting recovery of attorney fees to a party who has
achieved minimal success on the merits, such as obtaining a
favorable judgment on an issue.39 At the other extreme are
statutes allowing fee shifting only when a party has litigated in bad
faith.40 The degree of a trial court's discretion in awarding
attorney fees also extends over a spectrum, ranging from mandatory
obligation to award attorney fees, to unbounded discretion in
41
awarding attorney fees.
A literal reading of CCP section 1021 indicates that a court
42
can award attorney fees based only on a statute or contract.
Through California decisional law, however, exceptions to CCP
section 1021 have been developed.43 These exceptions are based
upon the inherent equity powers of the courts.
c. Equitable Attorney Fees
The California Supreme Court has recognized three equitable
exceptions to the literal reading of CCP section 1021: (1) The

36.

CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. § 1021 (West Supp. 1992).

37. Green, supra note 19, at 218.
38. Id.
39. Id
40. Id
41. Id
42. CAL CIv. PRoc. CODE § 1021 (West Supp. 1992). See supranote 21 providing pertinent
text of section 1021).
43. See infra notes 47-62 and accompanying text (discussing the three judicial exceptions to
section 1021).
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"common

fund" doctrine; 44 (2) the "substantial benefit"
doctrine;45 and (3) the "private attorney general" doctrine.46
The common fund doctrine is based on the principle of
preventing unjust enrichment.47 Under this doctrine, when a
litigant's efforts create or preserve a fund from which others derive
benefit, the litigant may require the beneficiaries to contribute to
the litigation costs and attorney fees. 4 The common fund

exception is based on the historic power of equity to permit the
trustee of a fund or property to recover costs and attorney fees
from the fund or the property itself, or from the parties receiving
the benefit.49 The plaintiff is eligible for an award under this
doctrine if the litigation affected the creation or recovery of an
identifiable fund from which attorney fees may be paid." A
modern derivative of the common fund doctrine is the substantial
benefit doctrine."
Like the common fund theory, the substantial benefit doctrine
is based on the notion that those who have been unjustly enriched
at another's expense should, under some circumstances, contribute
to the costs of the litigation that produced the benefits.5 2 Under
the substantial benefit doctrine, courts award attorney fees when the
litigant procures a judgment that confers a substantial benefit on
members of an ascertainable class.53 The benefit may be

44. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (discussing the common fund doctrine).
45. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing the common benefit doctrine).
46. See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text (discussing the private attorney general
doctrine).
47. Attorney Fees,supra note 25, § 3.12, at 36. The common fund doctrine is the oldest
equitable exception to the American Rule. Id
48. Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25,35,569 P.2d 1303, 1309, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315,318 (1977)
(quoting Quinn v. State, 15 Cal. 3d 162, 167, 539 P.2d 761, 764, 124 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1975).)
49. Serrano, 20 Cal. 3d at 35, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
50. Icd at 37, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 320. The fund must be preserved or created by the judgment
itself, rather than from legislative implementation of the judgment. Id In Serrano,the court denied
an award of attorney fees because the judgment did not require any particular expenditure. L An
identifiable fund was not created in Serrano; any monetary benefits would come only from the
legislative implementation of the judgment. Id.
51. Attorney Fees,supra note 25, § 3.13, at 38-39.
52. Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d 917,943,593 P.2d 200,214,
154 Cal. Rptr. 503, 517 (1979).
53. Serrano, 20 Cal. 3d at 35, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
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pecuniary or nonpecuniary, and may be conferred on plaintiffs or
defendants. 54 In addition to the foregoing judicial exceptions,
courts may award attorney fees under the private attorney general
doctrine.
The private attorney general doctrine encourages suits that
enforce a strong public policy and benefit a broad class of people
because it awards attorney fees to those who successfully sue
someone who has infringed on an important constitutional right.55
The doctrine has been rejected by the federal courts in the absence
of statutory authorization. 6 However, California state courts have
exercised their inherent equitable authority to award attorney fees
where litigants successfully pursue public interest litigation
vindicating important constitutional rights.57
In 1977, the California Legislature enacted CCP 1021.5."
Section 1021.5 codifies and broadens the equitable private attorney
general doctrine.59 California Code of Civil Procedure section
1021.5 provides explicit statutory authority for court-awarded
attorney fees under a private attorney general theory.0 California
Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 broadens the common law
private attorney general doctrine by permitting awards of attorney
fees in cases that vindicate statutory as well as constitutional
rights.61 Thus, the exceptions to the American Rule authorize the

54. Id
55. Woodland Hills, 23 Cal. 3d at 933, 593 P.2d at 208, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
56. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 42 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
57. Serrano,20 Cal. 3d at 43, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
58. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 1021.5 (West Supp. 1992). See infra note 60 (setting forth the
requirements under section 1021.5).
59. I
60. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1021.5 (West Supp. 1992) (providing that in order to be
deemed an action enforcing an important right affecting the public interest the action must meet the
following criteria: (1) A significant benefit must be conferred on the general public or large class of

persons; (2) the necessity and fimancial burden of private enforcement make the award appropriate;
and (3) such fees should not be paid out of the recovery, if any); see also Residents Ad Hoc Stadium
Comm. v. Board of Trustees, 89 Cal.App. 3d 274,292, 152 Cal. Rptr. 585,596 (1979) (holding that
CCP section 1021.5 does not violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution).
61. Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d 917,925,154 Cal. Rptr. 503,
506 (1979). "When other statutory criteria are satisfied, the section explicitly authorizes such award
in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest,
regardless of its source-constitutional, statutory or other." Id
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court to order one party to pay the other party's attorney fees. The

court must then determine the appropriate amount to pay the
attorney. There are various methods for arriving at the proper
figure.62
3. Determiningthe Amount of the Award in CaliforniaCourts
When a contract or statute provides for attorney fees, the fee
calculation may vary. The statute or contract may specifically limit
the amount of the fee,63 or provide a general right to attorney
fees, or specify a right to "reasonable" attorney fees.64 Where the
contract or statute specifies the amount to be awarded, the court
can award this amount even if it is unreasonable.' Where the
statute or contract is silent, the trial court has discretion to
determine the amount of the fee. 66 Thus, in order to determine the
amount of the attorney fee, the court will first look to see if the
contract or statute provides for a set amount, and if it does not, or

62. See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (discussing the methods for calculating
attorney fee awards).
63. See CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1031 (West Supp. 1992) (providing that the award of
attorney's fee cannot exceed 20% of the amount of the recovery); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 800 (West
Supp. 1992) (providing that award of attorney fee should be computed at $100 per hour, and should
not exceed $7500).
64. See CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 874.010 (West 1980) (providing for award of a reasonable
attorney fee); CAL. CIrv. CODE § 1695.7 (West 1985) (providing for award of a reasonable attorney
fee).
65. Johnson v. Kaeser, 196 Cal. 686, 695,239 P. 324,327-28 (1925) (holding that the court
has discretion to award the amount provided for in statute or contract, even if the amount is
unreasonable under the circumstances).
66. See Stokus v. Marsh, 217 Cal. App. 3d 647, 654, 266 Cal. Rptr. 90, 94 (1990) (stating
that a successful plaintiff who is awarded attorney fees is entitled to recover fees that are reasonable
and that bear a rational relationship to the substantive recovery). The issue of reasonableness is within
the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the factors to be considered in determining what
constitutes reasonable compensation include the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount
involved, the skill required and skill employed in handling the litigation, the attention given, the
success of the attorney's efforts, the learning, age, and experience in the particular type of work
demanded, the intricacies and importance of the litigation, the labor and necessity for legal training
and ability in trying the case, and the time consumed. Id. at 657, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 96; see also
California Interstate Tel. Co. v. Prescott, 228 Cal. App. 2d 408, 411, 39 Cal. Rptr. 472, 474 (1964)
(indicating that the trial judge is an expert in the matter of attorney fees, and the value of the
attorney's services is a matter with which a judge must necessarily be familiar). When the court is
informed of the extent and nature of such services, its own experience furnishes it with every element
necessary to fix the value of the fees. Id

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
if it provides for a reasonable attorney fee, the court will determine
what is reasonable under the circumstances.
B. Proceduresfor Filingfor Attorney Fees
Different procedures govern the award of statutory, contractual
and equitable attorney fees. 7 A party applies for attorney fees
either by including them in a memorandum of costs6" or by filing
a motion requesting reasonable attorney fees.6 In general,
statutory attorney fees are included in a memorandum of costs,
while contractual and equitable attorney fees are obtained by a
motion procedure.7" However, there are exceptions to these
general rules.7 '

1. Filing a Memorandum of Costs
a Statutory Fees
In California, attorney fees awarded pursuant to a statute are
recoverable as costs.' Thus, statutory attorney fees are usually
included in a memorandum of costs, rather than requested by
motion.73 The procedure for obtaining costs in the trial court is set

67. See infra notes 69-105 and accompanying text (discussing the different procedures
governing statutory, contractual and equitable attorney fee awards).
68. See CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1033 (West Supp. 1992) (providing that the memorandum
of costs must be served on the adverse party and filed no later than 10 days after the entry of
judgment); see also Coast Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Jensen, III Cal. App. 124, 126, 295 P. 346, 346-47
(1931) (holding that failure to file a cost bill extinguishes the remedy to recover costs). But see
Marini v. Municipal Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 829, 834, 160 Cal. Rptr. 465, 468 (1979) (noting that
the trial court has broad power to deviate from CCP section 1033).
69. See infra notes 72-93 and accompanying text (discussing the two methods of filing a
memorandum or a motion).
70. Attorney Fees, supra note 25, § 6.1, at 65.
71. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing exceptions to filing a
memorandum of costs to recover statutory attorney fees); notes 88-91 and accompanying text
(discussing exceptions to filing a motion to recover contractual attorney fees).
72. T.E.D. Bearing Co. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 38 Cal. App. 3d 59,62, 112 Cal. Rptr. 910,
914 (1974).
73. Id
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out in CCP section 1033. 74 Section 1033 provides that the
prevailing party must file with the court, and serve on the other
party, a memorandum of costs and disbursements at any time after
the court's verdict or decision is made, and not later than ten days
after the entry of judgment." However, some statutes provide
exceptions to CCP section 1033.76
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 codifies the
private attorney general doctrine. 77 This section states that
attorney fees should be applied for "upon motion.""8 Therefore
in order to recover attorney fees pursuant to section 1021.5, the
prevailing party must file a motion. The motion procedure is also
more appropriate in statutory fee cases which are settled informally
or dismissed, because there is no entry of judgment in such cases.
An entry of a judgment79 is required in order to file a
memorandum of costs."0 Since there is no entry of judgment when
a case is dismissed or settled informally, the motion procedure
must be used in order to receive attorney fees.
2. Filing a Motion
a. ContractualFees
The procedure for seeking contractual attorney fees varies
according to the facts of each case and the contract language. 8
The court looks to the language contained in the contract provision
to determine the correct procedure to follow.8 2 In City Investment

74. See CAL. CIv. PRoc. CoDE. § 1033 (West Supp. 1992) (providing the procedure for filing
memorandum of costs).

75.

id.

76. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing exceptions to CCP section 1033).
77. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West Supp. 1992). See supra notes 55-62 and
accompanying text (discussing the private attorney general theory).
78. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West Supp. 1992).
79. See Oppenheimer v. Ashburn, 173 Cal. App. 2d 624, 343 P.2d 931 (1959) (defining
'entry of judgment" as the date from which the time for filing an appeal begins).
80. Id. But see Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 93 Cal. App. 3d 256,265,155 Cal. Rptr.
516, 521 (1979) (allowing a cost bill to be filed after settlement).
81. Attorney Fees, supra note 25, § 7.2, at 78.
82. Genis v. Krasne, 47 Cal. 2d 241, 248, 302 P.2d 289, 293 (1956).
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Co. v. Pringle3 the court held that, when attorney fees are sought
solely under contract, they must be particularly alleged and
demanded in the complaint as special damages."
When a contract provides that reasonable attorney fees shall be
awarded to either party, and does not specify that they are to be
included as costs, courts generally allow a claim for fees by notice
of motion and motion. 5
b. Equitable Attorney Fees
The California courts have not yet defined the proper
procedures for filing an application for attorney fees pursuant to an
equitable theory. 6 In some of the recent equitable fee cases,
however, the prevailing party filed a motion for attorney fees. 7
In an equitable fee case, attorney fees should be alleged at the
earliest possible stage.8 8 However, one court of appeal has held
that CCP section 1021.5 does not require a special demand for
89
attorney fees in the complaint.

83. 49 Cal. App. 353, 193 P. 504 (1920).
84. 1 at 355, 193 P. at 504. The contract clause must be pleaded in the main action and
proven. Genis, 47 Cal. 2d at 246, 302 P.2d at 292.
85. Mabee v. Nurseryland Centers, Inc., 88 Cal. App. 3d 420, 428, 152 Cal. Rptr. 31, 36
(1979). The stage at which the court hears the motion varies with the facts of each case. I,
86. Attorney Fees, supra note 25, § 6.4, at 68.

87.

See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25,31,569 P. 2d 1303,1304,141 Cal. Rptr. 315,

316 (1977); Northington v. Davis, 23 Cal. 3d 955,957,593 P.2d 221,222, 154 Cal. Rptr. 524,525526 (1979).
88. Attorney Fees, supra note 25, § 6.4, at 68. The early allegations warn the opposing
counsel and the trial court that the fees will be requested, and put pressure on the opposing counsel
to settle the case. Id.
89. Committee for Sewer Referendum v. Humboldt Bay Wastewater Auth., 77 Cal. 3d 117,
125 n.7, 143 Cal. Rptr. 463, 468 n.7 (1978). Federal precedent does not require attorney fees to be
pleaded in complaint. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 440 F. Supp. 904, 912 n.20 (ND. Cal. 1977).
California courts have followed federal precedent in deciding many attorney fee issues. See, e.g.,
Woodland Hills Residents Assoc. v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d at 917, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1979);
Serrano, 20 Cal. 3d at 48 n.23, 569 P.2d at 1317 n23, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 328 n.23.
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c. Exceptions
In contract cases where the contract specifically provides that
fees may be included as costs, the party may file a cost bill rather
than filing a motion." Moreover, for attorney fees sought under
contract provisions implicating Civil Code section 1717, which
provides for a reciprocal right to attorney fees, attorney fees are
treated as an element of costs, and a cost bill procedure must be
followed. 9 ' For purposes of filing an application for attorney fees,
courts treat contractual attorney fees and equitable attorney fees
differently from statutory attorney fees.' Courts may draw similar
distinctions in other areas of legal procedure, such as the posting
of appeal bonds. 93
C. PostingAppeal Bonds
In addition to pleadings, the distinction courts draw between
statutory, equitable and contractual attorney fees may impact
appeals. For example, assume that the losing side appeals from a
judgment that includes attorney fees. Generally, a judgment for
costs alone will be automatically stayed pending appeal.' In
contrast, to stay a judgment for damages, the appellant must post
a bond with the court. 95 Thus, the categorization of attorney fees
as damages or costs will affect whether the appellant can stay the
award pending appeal. Given the courts' treatment of attorney fees
for pleading purposes, and the distinction courts draw between
contractual, equitable and statutory attorney fees, it might be

90. Genis v. Krasne, 47 Cal. 2d 241, 246, 302 P. 2d 289, 292 (1956).
91. See City Inv. Co. v. Pringle, 49 Cal. App. 353, 353, 193 P. 504, 504 (1920) (indicating
that cost bill must be filed when attorney fees ae sought under Civil Code Section 1717.)
92. See supra notes 72-93 and accompanying text (discussing the differences between
contractual, equitable and statutory attorney fees for purposes of applying for the fees).
93. See infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text (discussing the distinctions drawn between
different types of attorney fees for purposes of posting appeal bonds).
94. McCallion v. Hibemia Say., 98 Cal. 442,445,33 P.2d 329, 330 (1893). See infra notes
100-107 and accompanying text (discussing McCallion).
95. See infra notes 106-113 and accompanying text (discussing McCaffion, which held that
the appellant must post a bond to stay a judgment for money damages).
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presumed that the courts would make the same distinction for the
purposes of posting appeal bonds. If the same distinction were

made, then contractual and equitable attorney fees would require a
bond to stay them pending appeal, while statutory attorney fees
would be automatically stayed pending appeal. However, a review
of recent case law reveals that this presumption is probably not
correct."
Before delving into the cases, it is helpful to
understand the requirements and procedures for posting appeal
bonds.
1. Procedurefor PostingAppeal Bonds
California Code of Civil Procedure section 916 sets forth the
rule that filing an appeal automatically stays the judgment of the
trial court.9 7 However, section 916 indicates that there are a
number of exceptions to this general rule, in which the execution
of the judgment will only be stayed upon the filing of an appeal
bond with the court.9 8 One such exception is contained in CCP
section 917.1." 9 This section provides that a judgment for money
damages is not automatically stayed unless the appellant posts a
bond.1°° The amount of the bond must be double the amount of
the judgment. 101
In 1986, the legislature amended section 917.1 to include
subsection (d).1" Subsection (d) provides that, if costs are
awarded as part of the monetary damages, they are to be included
in the amount of the bond.1"3 This amendment is significant
because it implies that costs are important enough to require that

96.

See infra notes 177-266 and accompanying text (discussing three recent cases involving

attorney fees and appeal bonds).
97. See CAL. Civ. PROc. CODE § 916 (West Supp. 1992) (providing that the taking of an
appeal stays the judgment of the trial court in most circumstances).

98.

See id. §§ 116.810,917.1-917.9 (West Supp. 1992) (listing the exceptions to the automatic

stay provision of CCP section 916).

99. See i. § 917.1(a)-(d) (providing that judgments ordering the payment of money are not
automatically stayed pending appeal).
100.
101.

I § 917.1(a) (West Supp. 1992).
Id. § 917.1(b) (West Supp. 1992).

102. 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 1174, sec. 1, at 117840. See U § 917.1(d) (West Supp. 1992).
103. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 917.1(d) (West Supp. 1992).

1992 /Inconsistent ProceduresRegarding Attorney Fees
the appeal bond reflect their amount, at least where there is also a
money judgment. Section 917.1 does not address situations where
the court awards no monetary damages, and the judgment is for
costs alone." 4 However, cases decided before the 1986
amendment concluded that a judgment for costs alone was
10 5
automatically stayed pending appeal.
2. The Pre-Amendment Cases
The California Supreme Court McCallion v. Hibernia
Savings'°6 held that an award of costs alone was automatically
stayed pending appeal. 7 The McCallion court reasoned that,
because courts award costs in nearly every case, costs are
"incidental to the judgment."' ' Therefore, costs alone are not
the type of money judgment referred to in CCP section 917.1.'09
The McCallion court reasoned that if costs were the type of money
judgment contemplated by section 917.1, then the exception would
swallow the rule."0 In other words, courts would require a bond
in nearly every case, which would render the automatic stay
provision of section 916 superfluous.' Such an outcome would

be contrary to the legislative intent to require a bond only in the
instances enumerated as exceptions to the automatic stay
provision." 2
Thus, at least until subsection (d) was added in 1986, a
judgment for costs alone was automatically stayed pending appeal.
However, McCallion involved judgments which did not include

104. Vadas v. Sosnowski, 210 Cal. App. 3d 471, 473, 258 Cal. Rptr. 374, 375 (1989).
105. See McCallion v. Hibernia Say., 98 Cal. 442,33 P. 329 (1893). See also infra notes 106113 and accompanying text (discussing of McCallion).
106. 98 Cal. 442, 33 P. 329 (1893).
107. Xa. at 445,33 P.2d at330; see also Whitakerv. Title Ins.& Trust, 179 Cal. 111, 113, 175
P. 460, 462 (1918) (holding that an award of costs alone is automatically stayed pending appeal).
108. McCallion, 98 Cal. at 445, 33 P.2d at 330.
109. Id
110. Id
111. Id
112. Id. The Court inferred the legislative intent from the fact that certain exceptions were
enumerated, and as such, the legislature must have intended to provide exceptions only in those
particular circumstances. Id
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attorney fees as an item of the costs."' Therefore, McCallion did
not necessarily govern an award of attorney fees.
3. Is an Award of Attorney Fees Alone Automatically Stayed
Pending Appeal?
Two later cases looked to the reasoning behind McCallion to
determine if that logic applied to attorney fees."1 In these cases,
the answer depended on whether the court considered attorney fees
"ordinary costs" that were "incidental to the judgment" or
whether the court considered attorney fees "extraordinary costs,"
separate from ordinary costs. 5
In Chamberlin v. Dale'sRentals, the court indicated that some
costs are incidental to the judgment and awarded in nearly every
case, while other costs are not incidental to the judgment and not
routinely awarded." 6 The Chamberlin court indicated the former
are "ordinary costs," while the latter are "extraordinary"
costs. 7 In Chamberlin, the parties executed a contract with a fee
provision benefitting the prevailing party in the event of
litigation." Chamberlin sued Dale's Rentals and received a
judgment of compensatory and punitive damages. 9 Chamberlin
then filed a memorandum of costs including attorney fees.2
The Chamberlin court discussed McCallion, finding that the
costs that were automatically stayed in McCallion did not include
attorney fees. 121 The holding in McCallion did not purport to

113. Md
114. See Chamberlin v. Dale's Rentals, 188 Cal. App. 3d 356, 232 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1986);
Vadas v. Sosnowsld, 210 Cal. App. 3d 471,258 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1989); see also infra notes 116-126
and accompanying text (providing a full discussion of Chamberlin);notes 127-137 and accompanying

text (providing a full discussion of Vadas).
115. See Chamberlin, 188 Cal. App. 3d at 361-62,232 Cal. Rptr. at 788; Vados, 210 Cal. App.
3d at 473, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 375.

116. Chamberfin, 188 Cal. App. 3d at 361-62.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

160

Idat 364.
Id at 358.
Id
Id
Id
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apply to attorney fees. 1" Attorney fees, the court reasoned, are
more closely related to a litigated issue than an incident to the
judgment. l3 Furthermore, the Chamberlin court found that
attorney fees are not the type of costs that are awarded in virtually
every case, rather attorney fees are only awarded in certain limited
situations." The court in Chamberlin found that the arguments
used in McCallion against posting a bond for a money judgment
did not apply to attorney fees." As a result, the Chamberlin
court concluded that attorney fees should not be governed by
McCallion,
and the defendant was compelled to post an appeal
12 6
bond.
In 1989, the court in Vadas v. Sosnowski, 27 addressed the
distinction between incidental and non-incidental costs which the
Chamberlin court noted. 12 The Vadas court intimated that after
the 1986 amendment to section 917.1, McCallion may no longer be
good law. 129 In Vadas, the plaintiff appealed from a judgment
which required him to pay costs to the defendant. 3 ' The trial
court would not stay the judgment unless the plaintiff posted a
bond. 131 The plaintiff sought a writ of supersedeas' 32 to stay the
execution of the judgment. 33 The appellate court reversed, and

122.

Id. at 361.

123.

ld.

124. Id.
125. I&
126. IM.
127. 210 Cal. App. 3d 471, 258 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1989).
128. Id at 473, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 375; see supra notes 114-118 and accompanying text
(discussing distinction between incidental and non-incidental costs in Chamberlin).
129. Vadas 210 Cal. App. 3d at 473, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
130. Id at 472, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
131. Id.
132. See John Paul Lumber v. Agnew, 116 Cal. App. 2d 638, 639-40, 254 P.2d 131, 132
(1953) (stating that the purpose of the writ of supersedeas is to stay proceedings of the lower court
and preserve the status quo until the appeal is finished); Messenkop v. Duffield, 211 Cal. 222,225,
294 P. 715, 716 (1930) (noting that the effect of supersedeas is to hold matters in the condition that
they were in when the stay became effective); see also Erickson v. Bohne, 120 Cal. App. 2d 606,
606, 261 P.2d 782, 782 (1953) (indicating that issuance of the writ of supersedeas is discretionary,
and the party needs to show that there is a substantial question to be presented on appeal); Smith v.
Smith, 91 Cal. App. 743, 745, 267 P. 709,710 (1928) (holding that the writ of supersedeas only acts
to stay the hand of the lower court and not to undo anything that has been done).
133. Vadas, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 471,258 Cal. Rptr. at 374 (1989).
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held that a judgment for costs alone is automatically stayed
1 34
pending appeal.
The Vadas court pointed out that McCallion was decided prior
to the 1986 amendment to CCP section 917.1.'35 Moreover, the
court noted that since 1986, no reported decision had considered
whether a judgment for costs alone is still subject to the automatic
statutory stay on appeal. 13 6 The court in Vadas agreed with the
holding in Chamberlin that a judgment for attorney fees is
distinguishable from a judgment for costs,
since attorney fees are
13 7
judgments.
most
of
part
not routinely
McCallion, Chamberlin, Vadas and City Investment Co. v.
Pringle offer three possibilities for the characterization of attorney
fees in relation to the posting of appeal bonds. The McCallion
court held that ordinary costs are incidental to the judgment, from
which one could infer that attorney fees would be automatically
stayed pending appeal. 3 ' The Chamberlin and Vadas courts held
that attorney fees are extraordinary costs, which are not incidental
to the judgment, in which case appellant must post a bond to stay
them pending appeal.' 39 Finally, the court in City Investment Co.
v. Pringle held that contractual attorney fees that do not trigger
Civil Code section 1717, which provides for a reciprocal right to
attorney fees and monetary damages, in which case appellant would
post a bond to stay them pending appeal."u

134. Id
135. Id
136. Id at 473-74,258 Cal. Rptr. at 375-76. The Vadas court noted that the legislative history
of the 1986 amendment and the committee reports only discuss a judgment for costs as part of a
judgment for money damages and say nothing about a judgment for costs alone. Id But see Civil
Appellate Procedure, 1988 CAL. CoNrIwIo Enuc. BAR § 6.23 (indicating that prior law is

unchanged).
137.

Vadas, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 474,258 Cal. Rptr. at 3.

138. McCallion v. Hibernia Say., 98 Cal. 442,33 P. 329 (1893); see supra notes 105-113 and
accompanying text (discussing McCallion).
139. Chamberlin v. Dale's Rentals, 188 Cal. App. 3d 356,361,232 Cal. Rptr. 785,788 (1986);
Vadas v. SosnowsKi, 210 Cal. App. 3d 471, 474, 258 Cal. Rptr. 374, 376 (1989); see supra notes
109-119 and accompanying text (providing a full discussion of Chamberlin); notes 127-137 and
accompanying text (providing a full discussion of Vadas).
140. City Inv. v. Pringle, 49 Cal. App. 353, 193 P. 504 (1920); see supra note 91 and
accompanying text (discussing Pringle).
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D. Statutory Language Regarding Attorney Fees
It is unclear whether these three possibilities are mutually
exclusive, or whether two or more of them may be able to exist
together harmoniously. The statutes that refer to attorney fees and
costs exacerbate the confusion. No statute defines costs."' Some
statutes treat attorney fees as part of costs,1 42 while other statutes
treat the two items separately. 143 Finally, there are ambiguous
statutes which are not clear in their intent to treat attorney fees as
costs or as separate from costs.144
1. Attorney Fees as Costs
Although a large number of statutes categorize attorney fees as
part of costs to be awarded, other statutes do not.145 California
Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 provides that a prevailing
146
party in an action can recover costs as a matter of right.
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 lists the items
that are allowable as costs under section 1032."47 Contractual and
statutory attorney fees are among the items the legislature allows
as costs under section 1033.5.141 Furthermore, subsection (c)(5)

141. See Rabinowitch v. California Western Gas Co., 257 Cal. App. 2d 150, 161,65 Cal. Rptr.
1, 8 (1967) (pointing out that there is no statutory definition of costs).

142. See infra notes 145-154 and accompanying text (discussing statutes which treat attorney
fees as part of costs).
143. See infra notes 155-160 and accompanying text (discussing statutes which treat attorney
fees as separate from costs).
144. See infra notes 162-169 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguous statutes).
145. See Green, supra note 19, at 220 (providing that a number of statutes do not categorize
attorney fees as part of costs to be awarded).
146.

CAl. Clv. PROC. CODE § 1032 (West Supp. 1992).

147. See id § 1033.5(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1992) (providing that the following items are included
as costs: (1) Filing, motion and jury fees; (2) juror food and lodging while they are kept together
during trial and after the jury retires for deliberation; (3) taking, videotaping and transcribing
necessary depositions; (4) service of process; (5) expenses of attachment including keeper's fees; (6)
premiums on necessary bonds; (7) ordinary witness fees ordered by the court; (8) fees of expert
witnesses as ordered by the court; (9) transcripts of court proceedings ordered by the court; (10)
attorney fees, when authorized by contract or statute; (11) court reporters fees; (12) models and
blowups of exhibits; (13) any other item that is required to be awarded to the prevailing party
pursuant to statute).
148. I § 1033.5(a)(10)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1992).
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of section 1033.5 notes that where a statute refers to an award of
"costs and attorney fees," the attorney fees are an item of the
costs.'4 9 This seems to indicate that the legislature intended for
attorney fees to be costs under section 1032.
In actions for recovery of wages, CCP section 1031 provides
that the court "shall add, as part of costs, an attorney's fee.' 150
Similarly, other California statutes providing for attorney fees
include those fees as costs. 15' For instance, CCP section 874.010
provides that in partition of property proceedings, there is recovery
of costs of partition, "including reasonable counsel fees.' ' 152 In
an action for trespass, under CCP section 1021.6, the prevailing
153
party is entitled to attorney fees, "in addition to other costs.'
Finally, in an action for damages arising out of a peace officer's
conduct, under CCP section 1021.7, the prevailing party is entitled
to attorney fees "as part of costs."' 54
2. Attorney Fees as Separatefrom Costs
Some statutes, however, expressly distinguish costs and attorney
fees.' 55 For instance, under CCP section 1268.710, which covers
condemnation proceedings, attorney fees are expressly excluded
from costs. 56 There are also statutes which implicitly separate
attorney fees and costs by using the conjunction "and" between
the terms. 157 For instance, California Code of Civil Procedure
section 482.110 provides that a writ of attachment may include an
estimate of costs and attorney fees.'58 California Code of Civil

149. Id. § 1033.5(c)(5) (West Supp. 1992).
150. IA § 1031 (West Supp. 1992).
151. See supra notes 145-150 and accompanying text (discussing statutes that provide for
attorney fees as costs).
152. CAL. Cirv. PROc. CODE § 874.010 (West 1980).
153. Id. § 1021.6 (West Supp. 1992).
154. Id. § 1021.7 (West Supp. 1992).
155. See infra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing statutes that expressly distinguish

costs and attorney fees).
156. CAL. CODE CIv. PROc. § 1268.710 (West 1982).
157. See infra notes 158-160 and accompanying text (discussing statutes which separate costs
and fees by using the word "and" in between them).
158. CAL. CODE CV. PRoc. § 482.110 (West 1979).
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Procedure section 1029.8 provides that where an unlicensed person
causes injury to another, the court may award to the injured party
all costs and attorney fees. 59 Code of Civil Procedure section
1030 provides that, when a plaintiff is an out-of-state resident, the
court can require a bond to be posted to secure costs and attorney
fees.16 Thus, some statutes classify attorney fees as costs and
some statutes indicate that attorney fees are separate from costs.
Unfortunately, other statutes are ambiguous.
3. Ambiguous Statutes
Some statutes are not clear in their intent to treat attorney fees
as costs. 1 61 For instance, CCP section 1021 codifies the American
Rule that each party must pay its own legal fees.1 62 That section
states that "[e]xcept as attorney's fees are specifically provided for
by statute," agreements between the parties govern attorney fee
awards. 16 Section 1021 then provides that the parties are entitled
to have their costs paid as provided in the sections following
section 1021.14 Section 1021.5, which follows section 1021,
provides for the recovery of attorney fees in some situations.165
This indicates that the phrase "costs as hereinafter provided" was
intended to include attorney fees at least in situations addressed by
section 1021.5.16 The first part of section 1021 is a general
provision banning the recovery of attorney fees in an action except
as provided by statute or agreement. 1" The last clause authorizes
recovery of costs."6 This explicit bifurcation between the clauses
indicates a legislative intent that the attorney fees mentioned in the

159. I,. § 1029.8 (West Supp. 1992).
160. Id. § 1030 (West Supp. 1992).
161. See infra notes 162-169 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguous statutes).
162. See CAL. CODE Cv. PRoc. § 1021 (West Supp. 1992) (providing that each party is
responsible for their own attorney fees, except where a statute or contract provides otherwise); see
also supra note 21 (giving fll text of section 1021).
163. CAL. CoDE Civ. PRoc. § 1021 (West Supp. 1992).

164. lid
165.
166.

Id.
Id.

167. Id.
168.

Id.
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first clause are not part of the costs recoverable under the second
clause."6 It appears then, that the legislative intent regarding

contractual attorney fees is unclear. Thus, the statutes themselves
provide no consistent and concise rule whether attorney fees are
part of, or separate from, costs. It is not surprising, then, that the
case law trying to categorize attorney fees is similarly inconsistent.
IH.RECENT CASE LAW REGARDING ATrORNEY
FEES AND POSTING APPEAL BONDS
Three California cases, decided in different appellate districts,
demonstrate the varying interpretations among the courts as to
whether attorney fees are automatically stayed pending an appeal
or whether the appellant must post a bond to stay them. 170 In the
case of Nielsen v. Stumbos,17 1 the third district court of appeal
held that contractual attorney fees are automatically stayed pending
appeal. 72 In Banks v. Manos,1" the sixth district court of

appeal held that attorney fees awarded as sanctions under CCP
section 128.5 require the appellant to post a bond to stay the
judgment pending appeal.174 Finally, the second district court of
appeal in San Pedro v. Superior Court of Los Angeles,175
analogizing expert witness fees to attorney fees, held that expert

169. Mandel v. Myers, 106 Cal. App. 3d 384, 392-93, 165 Cal. Rptr. 148, 153 (1980). The
Mandel court also noted that the inclusion of section 1021.5 in the costs section does not imply a
legislative intent to define an award of attorney fees as an item of costs to be recovered pursuant to
the chapter, because if the legislature intended that attorneys fees awarded pursuant to section 1021.5
would be recoverable as costs it would have plainly said so. Id.
170. See Banks v. Manos, 232 Cal. App. 3d 123, 129,283 Cal. Rptr. 318,329 (1991) (holding
that attorney fees awarded as sanctions require an appeal bend in order to stay them pending appeal);
Bank of San Pedro v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 4th 950, 957, 283 Cal. Rptr. 372, 376 (1991)
(holding that expert witness fees require an appeal bend in order to stay them pending appeal);
Neilsen v. Stumbos, 226 Cal. App. 3d 301,305,276 Cal. Rptr. 272,275 (1990) (holding that attorney
fees awarded pursuant to contract are automatically stayed pending appeal); see also infra notes 177207 and accompanying text (discussing Neilsen); notes 208-241 and accompanying text (discussing
Banks); notes 243-263 and accompanying text (discussing San Pedro).
171. 226 Cal. App. 3d 301, 276 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1990).
172. ld at 305, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
173. 232 Cal. App. 3d 123, 129, 283 Cal. Rptr. 318, 329 (1991).
174. Banks v. Manos, 232 Cal. App. 3d 123, 129, 283 Cal. Rptr. 318, 329 (1991).
175. 3 Cal. App. 4th 950, 957, 283 Cal. Rptr. 372, 376 (1991).
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witness fees required the appellant to post a bond to stay them
pending appeal. 76
A. Nielsen v. Stumbos
In Nielsen v. Stumbos, the California Court of Appeal for the
Third District addressed whether the enforcement of an award of
attorney fees plus other costs is automatically stayed pending
appeal." 7 The plaintiff in Nielsen sued his former law partners
for an accounting.178 The partnership agreement provided that the
prevailing party would be entitled to reasonable attorney fees in the
event of litigation.'79 The trial court found for the defendants.8 0
The defendants submitted a memorandum of costs, including
attorney fees."8 ' The trial court awarded the defendants
$33,270.21 for costs and attorney fees. 8 2 The defendants
threatened to enforce the judgment unless the plaintiff posted a
bond to stay the judgment pending appeal.8 3 The plaintiff argued
that the filing of an appeal stays the enforcement of the judgment,
and sought a writ of supersedeas on this point.1
The appellate court in Nielsen looked to the applicable statutes,
and discussed the automatic stay provision of CCP section 916 and
the exception for money judgments of CCP section 917.1.185 The
court relied on McCallion,'86 stating that a judgment for costs
only is not a money judgment for purposes of section 917.1.197
According to the Nielsen court, any other construction would
negate the automatic stay provision of section 916.188 The court

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 957, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
Nielsen, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 303, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
Id.
Id
Id
1d
Id
I
AL
See i-d (citing CCP sections 916, 917.1).
See supra notes 106-113 and accompanying text (discussing McCallion).
Nielsen, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 303, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
Id at 304, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
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then addressed whether it should treat attorney fees as costs or as
a money judgment. 89 The Nielsen court looked no further than
the plain language of Civil Code section 1717, providing for the
recovery of attorney fees where a contract provides for such
recovery.' 9 Section 1717 allows an award of attorney fees to be
made to the prevailing party "in addition to other costs." 1 9 The
Nielsen court determined that the word "other" implies that
contractual attorney fees are merely one of several types of
costs." 2 Additionally, the court reviewed the third paragraph of
section 1717.193 That paragraph indicates that reasonable
attorney's fees shall be fixed by the court, and shall be an element
of the costs of the suit. 94
The court in Neilsen distinguished Chamberlin 5 by limiting
it to its facts.' 96 Chamberlin involved a judgment for money
damages.197 The issue in Chamberlin was whether a bond for that
money judgment should be increased to reflect the amount of the
award of attorney fees. 98 Nielsen did not involve a money
judgment, only an award of attorney fees.' 99 The question in
Nielsen was whether a bond must be posted at all if there is no
money judgment.2" The Neilsen court instead analogized to
Vadas v. Sosnowski.2 1 Like Nielsen, Vadas involved a judgment
for costs alone. 2 2 The Neilsen court supported this view by
pointing out that CCP section 1033.5, which lists the items
recoverable as costs, includes contractual attorney fees as items

189.
190.
191.
192.

d
Id
CAL CIV. CODE § 1717 (West Supp. 1992).
Nielsen, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 303, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 273.

193. Id
194. Id
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See supra notes 116-126 and accompanying text (discussing Chamberlin).
Nielsen, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 303, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
See supra notes 120-130 and accompanying text (discussing Chamberlin).
Chamberlin v. Dale's Rentals, 188 Cal. App. 3d 356,362,232 Cal.Rptr. 785,789 (1986).
Neilsen, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 305, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 274.

200. Id
201.
202.

168

Id; see supra notes 127-137 and accompanying text (discussing Vadas).
Vadas v. Sosnowski, 210 Cal. App. 3d 471, 471, 258 Cal. Rptr. 374, 374 (1989).
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allowable as costs under section 1032, which provides that the
prevailing party is entitled to costs as a matter of right.2 .3
Therefore, the court in Neilsen concluded that the plaintiff was
not required to post
a bond to stay the judgment for attorney fees
2 4
pending appeal. 0
The Neilsen holding, however, refers to contractual attorney
fees only. 5 The court does not address whether statutory
attorney fees would also be automatically stayed.2 6 A few
months later, the case of Banks v. Manos2 7 partially answered
that question.
B. Banks v. Manos
The Banks v. Manos case involved attorney fees awarded
pursuant to CCP section 128.5.208 Section 128.5 provides that the
court can order one party to pay the other party's attorney fees as
sanctions. 209 Banks held that such attorney fee awards do require
appellants to post a bond to stay them pending appeal.210
In Banks, the plaintiffs sued the defendants under the Home
Equity Sales Contracts Statute. 211 The plaintiffs sought equitable
relief, damages, attorneys fees and CoSts. 2 12 The trial court
granted summary judgment to the defendants. 213 The court
determined that the plaintiff had brought a frivolous lawsuit and,
as a sanction, ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant's attorney
fees. 214 The plaintiff filed an appeal, but the trial court refused to
stay the execution of the judgment pending appeal unless the

203. Neilsen, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 305, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 274-75.
204. Id
205. I&
206. 1& at 305, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
207. 232 Cal. App. 3d 123, 283 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1991).
208. Id at 126, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
209. CAL Civ. PRoc. CODE § 128.5 (West Supp. 1992).
210. Banks, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 126,283 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
211. Id
212. Id
213. Id
214. Id
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plaintiff posted a bond.215 The plaintiff sought a writ of
supersedeas.216 The California Court of Appeal for the Sixth
District in Banks held that the plaintiff was not entitled to an
automatic stay, and must post a bond to stay the execution of what
the Banks court called a "money judgment." 217
The court discussed Vadas v. Sosnowski,21 indicating that a
judgment for costs alone does not require a bond, since courts
routinely award costs.21 9 According to the Banks court, to require
a bond would negate the automatic stay provisions of section
916.220 The Banks court pointed out, referring to Chamberlin,"21
that a judgment for damages plus attorney fees must be bonded for
the full amount, since attorney fees, unlike costs, are not routinely
part of most judgments.' 2 The court in Banks found that attorney
fees awarded as sanctions differ from contractual attorney fees,
statutory attorney fees and costs.m
The court in Banks distinguished Nielsen224 by noting the
differences between statutory attorney fees and attorney fees
awarded pursuant to CCP section 128.5.' Section 128.5 does not
authorize awards of attorney fees as a matter of course.226
However, section 128.5 does authorize the court to award attorney
fees as sanctions. 7 The court in Banks noted that section 128.5
is applied only in extraordinary cases."2 The Banks court then
pointed out that Civil Code section 1717 authorizes the court to
award attorney fees to the prevailing party whenever the contract

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

IdL
Id
Id at 126-27, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
See supra notes 127-137 and accompanying text (discussing Vadas).
Banks, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 127, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 320,
Id
See supra notes 116-126 and accompanying text (discussing Chamberlin).
Banks, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 127, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
Id

224. See supra notes 177-207 and accompanying text (discussing Neilsen).
225. Banks, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 128, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
226. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West Supp. 1992) (providing that the court can award
attorney fees as sanctions).
227. Id
228. Banks, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 128, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
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provides for attorney fees, and courts routinely apply section
1717.22 Further, the Banks court noted that contractual attorney
fees are identified as costs under CCP section 1033.5,' ° which
provides that contractual attorney fees are included as costs for
purposes of CCP section 1032." Section 1032 provides that the
prevailing party is entitled to costs.1 2 Next, the Banks court
found that attorney fees awarded pursuant to section 128.5 also
differ from attorney fees awarded pursuant to statute, because
judgments for sanctions are not necessarily related to the size of
the recovery or the amount of time billed by the attorney.233
The court in Banks determined that attorney fees awarded as
sanctions differ from costs in five respects.' 3 First, attorney fees
as sanctions are similar to a monetary judgment, because the fees
represent damages for abusive legal tactics." Second, courts
routinely award costs, while attorney fees as sanctions have
extraordinary application.236 Third, the court can award attorney
fees sanctions against a third party. 7 On the other hand, the
court can only award costs to the prevailing party, which includes
only the plaintiffs and defendants. 2" Fourth, the language in
section 1033.5 indicates that if a statute authorizes an award of

"attorney fees and costs," the attorney fees are awarded as part of
the costs.2 39 Finally, since section 128.5 only imposes
"reasonable expenses" as an element of sanctions and makes no
mention of costs, the legislature did not intend to classify sanctions
as costs.24°
229. Id
230. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODB § 1033.5 (West Supp. 1992).
231. Banks, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 128, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
232. CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 1032 (West Supp. 1992).
233. Banks, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 128, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 320-21.
234. Id
235. Id
236. Id at 129, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
237. Id
238. Id
239. Id; see CAL Civ. PROc. CODE § 1033.5 (West Supp. 1992) (providing that the court can
allow certain items as costs); supra note 147 (providing a complete list of the items allowable as

costs).
240. Banks, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 129,283 Cal. Rptr. at 321. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 128.5
(West Supp. 1992) (providing that the Court can award attorney fees as sanctions).
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Therefore, the Banks court concluded that an award for attorney
fees as sanctions under section 128.5 required the appellant to post
an appeal bond to stay the judgment pending appeal. 41 After
Banks, it would seem that contractual and statutory attorney fees
are automatically stayed pending appeal, with the exception of CCP
section 128.5, which requires a bond to be posted in order to stay
the judgment. However, the case of Bank of San Pedro v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles,242 decided six days after Banks, interprets
the law on this point very differently than the court in Banks.
C. Bank of San Pedro v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
In Bank of San Pedro v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, the
California Court of Appeal for the Second District addressed
whether expert witness fees are automatically stayed pending
appeal.243 The court analogized expert witness fees to attorney
fees and held that expert witness fees, like attorney fees, are not
ordinarily part of the costs awarded at trial.244 The court reasoned
that since attorney fees require a bond to stay them pending appeal,
expert witness fees also require a bond.24
In San Pedro, Goodstein, the real party in interest, sued
numerous defendants, including the Bank of San Pedro.246
Ultimately, the Bank of San Pedro obtained a judgment for nonsuit.247 The Bank then moved to collect $116,184 in expert
witness fees under CCP section 998. 24' That section authorizes
the court to order a plaintiff to pay the defendant's expert witness
fees where the plaintiff refuses a settlement offer and subsequently

241. Banks, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 129,283 Cal. Rptr. at 321. The court noted that if part of the
judgment is required to be bonded, then the rest of the judgment must be bonded. Id.

242.

2 Cal. App. 4th 950, 283 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1991).

243.

Id at 955-56, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 375.

244.

Id

245. Id
246. Id at 952, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
247. Id
248. Id; see CAL. Cv. PRoc. CODE § 998(d) (West Supp. 1992) (providing that the court may
require a defendant to pay a plaintiff's expert witness fees if the defendant does not accept an offer
to compromise made by plaintiff, and then fails to receive a more favorable judgment at trial).
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fails to recover more than the offer at trial.2' The plaintiff
appealed, and refused to post a bond."0 The defendant moved to
require the plaintiff to post a bond, but the trial court denied the
motion. 1 The defendant sought a writ of supersedeas.
The San Pedro court discussed CCP section 917.1, the
exception for money judgments from the automatic stay provision
of section 916."s The San Pedro court noted that a conflict in the
law had developed as a result of Vadas. 4 As described above,
Vadas held that a judgment for ordinary costs is automatically
stayed pending appeal. 2s5 The San Pedro court limited Vadas by
noting that Vadas only involved routine costs, not extraordinary
costs.

56

After distinguishing Vadas, the San Pedro court referred to the
holding in Chamberlin that the collection of costs, which are not
routinely part of most judgments, would not be stayed pending
appeal unless the appellant posted a bond. 257 As the court did in
Chamberlin, the court in San Pedro reasoned that extraordinary
costs such as attorney fees were not the type of costs implicated in
McCallion. s8 The McCallion court held that, since courts award
costs in virtually every case, requiring a bond in every case would
negate the automatic stay provision of section 916."s
The San Pedro court then analogized the attorney fees in
Chamberlin to the expert witness fees in the case at hand, and
determined that expert witness fees are not ordinarily a part of the

249. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 998 (West Supp. 1992).
250. San Pedro, 3 Cal. App. 4th at 953, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
251. Id,
252. Id. at 953, 283 Cal. Rptr at 375.
253. Id at 376,283 Cal. Rptr. at 375; see CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 917.1(a) (West Supp. 1992)
(providing that ajudgment that includes money damages is not automatically stayed pending appeal).
254. San Pedro, 3 Cal. App. 4th at 955, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 375; see supra notes 127-137 and
accompanying text (discussing Vadas).
255. See supra notes 127-37 and accompanying text (discussing Vadas).

256.
257.
356, 362,
258.
259.

San Pedro, 3 Cal. App. 4th at 956, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 375-76.
Id, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 376 (referring to Chamberlin v. Dale's Rentals, 188 Cal. App. 3d
232 Cal. Rptr. 785, 788 (1986).).
Id
See supra notes 100-107 and accompanying text (discussing McCallion).
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costs courts generally awarded at trial. 260 In addition, courts do
not award expert witness fees in virtually every case.26 Finally,
expert witness fees are a directly litigated issue, rather than an
incidental matter. 262 The court in San Pedro concluded therefore,
that expert witness fees, like attorney fees, are not automatically
263
stayed pending appeal.
In sum, Nielsen, Banks, and San Pedro do not appear to offer
consistent resolutions to the problem of whether attorney fees are
automatically stayed pending appeal. The Nielsen court held that an
award of contractual attorney fees is automatically stayed pending
appeal.2"' The Banks court held that attorney fees awarded as
sanctions do require the appellant to post a bond to stay the award
pending appeal. 26 Finally, the San Pedro court, analogizing
expert witness fees to attorney fees, held that expert witness fees
require appellant to post a bond to stay the fees pending
2
appeal. 6
Il.

RAMIFICATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

A. Reconciliation of the Cases
Despite the apparent inconsistency of the Neilsen, Banks and
San Pedro cases, it is possible to reconcile the cases by reading the
holdings narrowly. First, Neilsen and Banks can be factually
limited. Neilsen involved attorney fees awarded pursuant to
contract, so it stands for the narrow proposition that contractual
attorney fees are automatically stayed pending appeal.267 Banks

260. San Pedro, 3 Cal. App. 4th at 956,283 Cal Rptr. at 376.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Neilsen v. Stumbos, 226 Cal. App. 3d 301,305,276 Cal. Rptr. 272,275 (1990); see supra
notes 177-207 and accompanying text (discussing Neilsen).
265. Banks v. Manos, 232 Cal. App. 3d 123,129,283 Cal. Rplr. 318, 321; see supra notes 208241 and accompanying text (discussing Banks).
266. San Pedro, 3 Cal. App. 4th at 957,283 Cal. Rptr. at 376; see supra notes 243-263 and
accompanying text (discussing San Pedro).
267. Neilsen, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 305, 276 CaL Rptr. at 275.
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involved attorney fees awarded as sanctions, so it stands for the
narrow proposition that attorney fees as sanctions are not
automatically stayed pending appeal. 26 Finally, the discussion in
San Pedro that attorney fees are not automatically stayed is mere
dicta, and was not part of the holding of that case.26 The San
Pedrocase only referenced attorney fees by analogy, and therefore,
stands for the narrow270proposition that expert witness fees are not
automatically stayed.
B. Criticism of the Cases
If Neilsen, Banks and San Pedro, are not reconciled by
interpreting the holdings narrowly, they have the potential to
present even more problems. Neilsen, Banks and San Pedro have
created uncertainty in the law as to whether an appeal bond must
be posted for a judgment of attorney fees alone. Such uncertainty
breeds increased litigation, and undermines society's confidence in
the judicial system.27 When the law is uncertain, it encourages
potential litigants to sue, since the case could easily go either
way.272 When the law is settled, it deters many potential litigants.
The increased litigation, caused by the uncertainty in the law, costs
the judicial system money, and congests the court system.
Additionally, when the law is uncertain, it causes people to lose
faith in a judicial system. 273
This uncertainty in the law surrounding attorney fees and
posting appeal bonds can be resolved in three different ways. The
following subsection discusses each solution in turn, first offering

268. Banks, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 129,283 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
269. Neilsen, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 305, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
270. Id
271. See Green, supra note 19, at 235 (noting that uncertainty in the law results in increased
litigation).
272. G. Robert Blakey, Symposium Law and the Continuing Enterprise, 65 NoTRE DAME L
REV. 1073, 1078 (1990).
273. Miller v. Arizona Bank, 43 P.2d 518, 527 (1935) (noting that experience proves that

uncertainty in the law is generally more harmful to the public in the long run than occasional
inconveniences).
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a broad rule and then offering a more narrow rule based on the
subtle differences between the various types of attorney fees.
C. Solutions to the Problem
1. Treat Attorney Fees as Partof Damages
The broadest possible solution is to treat all attorney fees as
damages for purposes of posting appeal bonds. If an award for
attorney fees alone is deemed a judgment for money damages, then
the losing party would have to post a bond in order to stay the
award pending appeal. When the court awards attorney fees in
addition to money damages, the appeal bond must be increased to
reflect the amount of the attorney fees.274 There does not seem to
be any reason, then, why a judgment for attorney fees alone should
not require a bond. However, such a bright line rule is a very blunt
instrument, and may not be sensitive enough to the differences
between the three types of attorney fees. Perhaps a better solution
is one which contemplates those differences.
The two procedures for applying for attorney fees and the
policies behind those procedures provide an practical line of
demarcation. 25 To apply for statutory attorney fees, a party must
include them in the memorandum of costs. "76 This indicates that
such fees are similar to costs or perhaps actually are costs. The
provisions for these fee awards are found in statutes, just as the
provisions for cost awards are found in statutes. 2 " To apply for
contractual and equitable attorney fees, a party must file a motion
with the court requesting such fees.27 This procedure separates

274. Chamberlin v. Dale's Rentals, 188 Cal. App. 3d 356,362,232 Cal. Rptr. 785,788 (1986).
275. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text (discussing procedure for applying for
attorney fees); supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text (discussing procedure for posting appeal

bonds).
276.

See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (discussing filing for statutory attorney

fees).
277. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text (discussing procedure for filing contractual
and equitable attorney fees).
278. City Inv. v. Pringle, 49 Cal. App. 353, 355, 193 P. 504, 505 (1920); see supra note 91
and accompanying text (discussing Pringle).
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these types of attorney fees from costs, and treats them differently.
Most likely, this is because contractual and equitable attorney fees
are more closely tied to the merits of the case and are more similar
to a litigated issue. Contractual attorney fees even have to be
pleaded in the complaint and proved at trial as special
damages." 9 There is every reason to treat them as damages for
the purposes of posting appeal bonds as well. In order to recover
equitable attorney fees, the prevailing party must meet certain
requirements."'
Whether or not the party meets those
requirements must be adjudicated during the course of the trial.
Thus, equitable attorney fees are a litigated issue in the trial, just
as damages are. Since statutory and equitable attorney fees are
distinct enough from costs to require a motion to be filed in order
to receive them, they are also distinct enough to require a bond to
be posted in order to stay them.
This solution is problematical, because contractual attorney fees

that implicate Civil Code section 1717, as costs, will be
automatically stayed, while contractual attorney fees that do not
implicate Civil Code section 1717, as damages, will require a
bond.28" Section 1717 is only implicated when a contract unfairly
provides for attorney fees to one party. 8 2 If section 1717 attorney
fees are automatically stayed pending appeal, it will encourage
drafters of contracts to include a one-sided provision for attorney
fees, so that the contract falls under section 1717. This would
undermine the section's attempt to alleviate the unfairness of onesided attorney fee provisions.
2. Treat Attorney Fees as ExtraordinaryCosts
Another possible solution is to follow the distinction drawn in
Vadas and Chamberlain, treating attorney fees as extraordinary

279. See supra note 60 (discussing requirements for receiving attorney fees under private

attorney general theory).
280. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text (discussing Civil Code section 1717).
281. See supranotes 114-134 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between ordinary
and extraordinary costs).
282. See supra notes 208-241 and accompanying text (discussing Banks).

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
costs which require a bond to be posted to stay them pending
appeal.2 3 A broad rule would treat all attorney fees as
extraordinary costs and require a bond for all attorney fees, whether
awarded pursuant to contract, statute or equitable considerations.
Once again, this broad rule might be too blunt an instrument,
because there may be reasons to treat certain awards of attorney
fees as ordinary costs. A rule which contemplates the subtle
differences between the three types of attorney fees may be more
workable.
3. Require Bond Only When Equity Requires
The best solution would be to require a bond when equity
requires it. This would not be a bright line rule that attorneys and
parties can count on to work in their favor every time. Attorneys
will have to present and brief the issue at trial. However, a rule
that requires the court to determine if equity requires a bond to be
posted to stay a judgment for attorney fees alone best serves the
purpose behind awarding attorney fees in certain situations. Equity
requires a bond to be posted for attorney fees whenever attorney
fees are awarded under the private attorney general doctrine.284
Additionally, equity
may require attorney fees awarded as sanctions
285
to require a bond.
The private attorney general doctrine was created by the courts
and codified in CCP section 1021.5 to provide potential litigants
with an incentive to vindicate an important right or policy.286 It
is intended to encourage those litigants who are motivated by the
policy of benefiting others. 8 7 Moreover, not only are potential
litigants motivated by the private attorney general theory, attorneys
are also motivated to take cases where the plaintiff will not be able.

283. Carl Cheng, ImportantRights and the PrivateAttorney GeneralDoctrine, 73 CALIF. L
REv. 1929, 1929 (1985).
284. Id.
285. ld.
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to afford the costs of the suit.288 The private attorney general
theory awards attorney fees to the plaintiff's attorney whenever the
suit meets certain criteria.28 9 This encourages attorneys to devote
their time and energy to public interest lawsuits. If attorneys cannot
be secure that this award will be forthcoming, they will be
discouraged from litigating public interest lawsuits.
In public interest suits, the judgment is usually an injunction,
not damages. Thus, there are many cases where the judgment will
be for attorney fees alone. The losing party must post a bond for
these attorney fees in order to give attorneys a sense of security
that they will indeed be paid. If the attorney must await the
resolution of the appeal, the other party has the chance, in the
interim, to sell, encumber, transfer or conceal his assets.290 The
other party might also, in good faith, go bankrupt. 291 While this
is also a possibility where attorney fees are awarded pursuant to
statute or contract, the public interest arena is the only place where
this result has a grave impact. Attorneys will lose their incentive to
litigate important public interests and society will lose its voice in
the courts. For equitable and policy reasons, therefore, attorney fees
awarded under the private attorney general theory must require a
bond to be posted in order to stay them pending appeal.
As the court in Banks indicated, attorney fees awarded as
sanctions are different from other types of attorney fees.2'
Attorney fees awarded as sanctions are punishment against a party
or attorney for misconduct and they are restitution for the
aggrieved party for having endured that wrongdoing.293 In this
regard, sanctionable attorney fees are more similar to damages than
any other type of attorney fees.29 If equity requires a judgment
for money damages to be stayed only by posting a bond, then the
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same logic requires a judgment for attorney fees as sanctions to be
stayed only by posting a bond.
IV. CONCLUSION

Equity demands that attorney fees awarded pursuant to the
private attorney general theory must not be automatically stayed
pending appeal. Additionally, logic demands that attorney fees
awarded as sanctions must not be automatically stayed pending
appeal. Contractual and statutory attorney fees, while they are not
routine costs, must be automatically stayed pending appeal.
Contractual attorney fees can conceivably arise in every contract
action. Over 200 statutes provide for attorney fees in California,
and other states are not far behind. 295 Between these two sources
of attorney fee awards, courts have occasion to award attorney fees
quite frequently. While such attorney fees have been deemed
"extraordinary" in the past, they are not so extraordinary as to
require a bond to be posted to stay them pending appeal.
The holdings of Neilsen and Banks and the dicta of San Pedro
must be reconciled. The conflicting holdings in various appellate
courts are unacceptable, because they create uncertainty in the law.
Furthermore, the inconclusive status of attorney fees as part of
costs, or as separate from costs, adds to the confusion and
uncertainty. The legislature or the courts must draw some lines and
set some boundaries in the area of attorney fees, particularly with
regard to whether a judgment for attorney fees alone requires a
bond to be posted pending appeal.
Jineen T Cuddy
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